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Abstract—Near-sensor data analytics is a promising direction
for IoT endpoints, as it minimizes energy spent on communication
and reduces network load - but it also poses security concerns, as
valuable data is stored or sent over the network at various stages
of the analytics pipeline. Using encryption to protect sensitive
data at the boundary of the on-chip analytics engine is a way to
address data security issues. To cope with the combined workload
of analytics and encryption in a tight power envelope, we propose
Fulmine, a System-on-Chip based on a tightly-coupled multi-core
cluster augmented with specialized blocks for compute-intensive
data processing and encryption functions, supporting software
programmability for regular computing tasks. The Fulmine SoC,
fabricated in 65 nm technology, consumes less than 20 mW on
average at 0.8 V achieving an efficiency of up to 70 pJ/B in
encryption, 50 pJ/px in convolution, or up to 25 MIPS/mW in
software. As a strong argument for real-life flexible application
of our platform, we show experimental results for three secure
analytics use cases: secure autonomous aerial surveillance with
a state-of-the-art deep CNN consuming 3.16 pJ per equivalent
RISC op; local CNN-based face detection with secured remote
recognition in 5.74 pJ/op; and seizure detection with encrypted
data collection from EEG within 12.7 pJ/op.
I. INTRODUCTION
The key driver for the development of the Internet-of-Things
(IoT) is collecting rich and diverse information streams from
sensors, which can then be fed to state-of-the-art learning-
based data analytics algorithms. The information distilled by
data analytics on such a rich input set can be used in a virtually
unlimited set of applications, such as healthcare or home
automation, which have the possibility to change the life of any
person for the better [1]. However, in practice, the possibility
to seamlessly tap into this rich stream of data is limited by
two equally important factors. First, the amount of data an IoT
end-node can extract from sensors and send over the network
for analytics is essentially defined by the energy necessary for
data transfer itself. Since IoT end-nodes must work within a
tiny power envelope, this fact introduces a significant limit on
the volume of data that can be transferred, e.g. the size of
captured images, therefore curtailing their usefulness. Second,
due to the ubiquitous nature of IoT devices, they often
deal with private or safety critical input data even beyond
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the predictions of their designers; not only devices such as
healthcare wearables acquire potentially safety-critical data,
but also seemingly innocuous devices (such as cameras) can
potentially acquire highly sensitive information [2]. To ensure
practicality of IoT-based applications, it is imperative that data
transmission from end-nodes to the network is protected from
data theft or malicious tampering.
To address the first limiting factor, near-sensor smart data
analytics is a promising direction; IoT end-nodes must evolve
from simple data collectors and brokers into analytics devices,
able to perform a pre-selection of potentially interesting data
and/or to transform it into a more abstract, higher information
density form such as a classification tag. With the burden
of sensemaking partially shifted from centralized servers to
distributed end-nodes, the energy spent on communication
and the network load can be minimized effectively and more
information can be extracted, making the IoT truly scalable.
However, performing analytics such as feature extraction or
classification directly on end-nodes does not address the secu-
rity concerns. It worsens them: distilled data that is stored or
sent over the network at several stages of the analytics pipeline
is even more privacy-sensitive than the raw data stream [3],
[4]. Protecting sensitive data at the boundary of the on-chip
analytics engine is a way to address these security issues;
however, cryptographic algorithms come with a significant
workload, which can easily be of 100-1000s of processor
instructions per encrypted byte [5].
This security workload is added to the computational effort
imposed by leading feature extraction and classification algo-
rithms, such as deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs).
CNNs are extremely powerful in terms of data analytics, and
state-of-the-art results in fields such as computer vision (e.g.
object detection [6], scene parsing [7], and semantic segmenta-
tion tasks [8]) and audio signal analytics [9] have been demon-
strated. While effective, deep CNNs usually necessitate many
billions of multiply-accumulate operations, as well as storage
of millions of bytes of pre-trained weights [10]. The combined
workload necessary to tackle these two limitations to the devel-
opment of smarter IoT - namely, the necessity for near-sensor
analytics and that for security - is formidable, especially under
the limited available power envelope and the tight memory and
computational constraints of deeply embedded devices. One
possible solution is to augment IoT end-nodes with specialized
blocks for compute-intensive data processing and encryption
functions while retaining full software programmability to
cope with lower computational-intensity tasks. Specialized
processing engines should be tightly integrated both with the
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2software-programmable cores and with one another, streamlin-
ing the process of data exchange between the different actors
as much as possible to minimize the time and energy spent in
data exchange; at the same time, to simplify their usage from
the developer’s perspective, it should be possible to abstract
them, integrating them in standard programming models used
in software development for IoT-aware platforms.
In this work, we propose the 65 nm Fulmine secure data
analytics System-on-Chip (SoC), which tackles the two main
limiting factors of IoT end-nodes while providing full pro-
grammability, low-effort data exchange between processing
engines, (sufficiently) high speed, and low energy. The SoC
is based on the architectural paradigm of tightly-coupled
heterogeneous shared-memory clusters [11], where several en-
gines (which can be either programmable cores or specialized
hardware accelerators) share the same first-level scratchpad
via a low-latency interconnect. In Fulmine, the engines are
four enhanced 32-bit OpenRISC cores, one highly efficient
cryptographic engine for AES-128 and KECCAK-based en-
cryption, and one multi-precision convolution engine special-
ized for CNN computations. Due to their memory sharing
mechanism, cores and accelerators can exchange data in a
flexible and efficient way, removing the need for continuous
copies between cores and accelerators. The proposed SoC
performs computationally intensive data analytics workloads
with no compromise in terms of security and privacy, thanks
to the embedded encryption engine. At the same time, Ful-
mine executes full complex pipelines including CNN-based
analytics, encryption, and other arbitrary tasks executed on
the processors.
This claim is exemplified in three practical use cases: secure
autonomous aerial surveillance in a nano-Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (nano-UAV) consuming 3.16 pJ per equivalent RISC
operation; on-device CNN-based face detection (as part of
a recognition pipeline) with 5.74 pJ per operation, including
image encryption for external face recognition; and seizure
detection with secure data collection within 12.7 pJ per op-
eration. We show that on a workload consisting of balanced
contributions from CNNs, AES, and other SW-implementable
filters, Fulmine provides the best result in terms of pJ-per-
equivalent-RISC-operation, with the nearest state-of-the-art
platform in terms of efficiency needing 89× more time to
execute the workload.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II
we compare Fulmine with the state-of-the-art in low-power
IoT computing devices. Section III describes the architecture
of the SoC; cluster-coupled HW coprocessors are detailed in
Section IV. Section V evaluates the implementation results and
overall performance, while Section VI focuses on real-world
use cases. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART AND RELATED WORK
A. Low-Power Encryption Hardware IPs
Authenticated encryption is a hot topic in the cryptographic
community since it adds additional services on top of data
confidentiality. AES in the Galois Counter Mode [12] (AES-
GCM) is one of the most used authenticated encryption
schemes today. For example, Intel added a dedicated finite
field multiplication to the AES-NI extension, with a throughput
up to 1.03 cpb [13]. However, solutions of this kind are
clearly targeting a different scenario from small, low-power
IoT devices.
Only a few IoT-oriented commercial AES controllers are
available; an example is the Maxim MAXQ1061 [14], claim-
ing up to 20 Mbit/s (power consumption data is not currently
disclosed). Research AES accelerators in the sub-100 mW
range for the IoT domain have been proposed by Mathew et
al. [15] in Intel 22nm technology, Zhang et al. [16] in TSMC
40 nm and Zhao et al. [17] in 65 nm; the latter reaches effi-
ciency up to 620 Gbit/s/W thanks to efficient body biasing and
a statistical design flow targeted at reducing worst-case guard
bands. A device consuming as little as 0.25 µW for passive
RFID encryption has been proposed by Hocquet et al. [18].
The main differentiating point between our contribution and
these hardware encryption techniques is the tightly coupled
integration within a bigger low-power system.
B. Low-Power CNN Hardware IPs
The most common way to accelerate CNNs is to rely on
powerful GP-GPUs [7][19] or on FPGAs [20][21]. Some
programmable embedded platforms such as ODROID-XU
[22], or Movidius Myriad 2 [23] improve the energy efficiency
of software CNN implementations to up to 120 Gop/s/W
within a few Watts of power envelope, targeting embedded
systems such as smartphones or UAVs as well as the booming
autonomous car business [24]. While these platforms are
typically powerful enough for embedded scenarios that are
not significantly power-constrained (e.g. deep-learning driven
autonomous driving), we do not consider them directly com-
parable to our proposal, since they cannot be used in low-
power endnodes: their efficiency is relatively low (up to tens
of GMAC/s/W for most GPU and FPGA implementations)
and their peak power envelope is typically too high, up to
∼10W - 100× the typical envelope considered for endnodes.
To the best of our knowledge, the only deep neural network
commercial solution specifically designed for IoT end-nodes
is WiseEye, to be presented by CEVA at CES 2017 [25].
Most research architectures for acceleration of CNNs have
focused on specialized architectures to accelerate convolu-
tional layers (e.g. Origami [26]), or convolutional and pooling
layers (e.g. ShiDianNao [27] and Eyeriss [28]). These accel-
erators reach efficiencies in the order of a few hundreds of
equivalent Gop/s/W. However, they all rely on highly spe-
cialized architectures, their flexibility is limited, and most of
them are not capable of implementing the other functionality
required by IoT end-nodes, including security and general-
purpose signal processing tasks.
One big differentiating point between these platforms are
their assumptions in terms of algorithmic and arithmetic
accuracy. Jaehyeong et al. [29] rely on 24bit fixed-point arith-
metics, but they approximate weights using a low-dimensional
representation based on PCA. Most other works use either 16
bits [30], [31] or 12 bits [26]. However, recent algorithmic
developments such as BinaryConnect [32] suggest that it is
3possible to reduce CNN weight precision down to a single
bit with limited accuracy losses. This has been exploited
in platforms such as YodaNN [33] to reach efficiency in
the order of tens of equivalent Top/s/W. Another promising
approach to improve energy efficiency in classification tasks
are extreme learning machines (ELM), based on single-hidden
layer feedforward neural networks. Although they have been
proven to consume as little as 0.47 pJ/MAC [34][35], their
applicability to real-life applications is still restricted to very
simple problems.
In this work a flexible approach has been adopted, where the
precision of images is fixed to 16 bits, while that of weights
can be scaled from 16 to 4 bits. This approach avoids the
requirement of specific training for binary connected networks,
while weight precision can be scaled according to the specific
application requirements in terms of accuracy, throughput and
energy efficiency.
C. End-Node Architectures
Traditional end-node architectures for the IoT leverage tiny
microprocessors, often Cortex-M0 class, to deal with the
extreme low-power consumption requirements of applications.
Several commercial solutions have been proposed, among
the others, by TI [36], STMicroelectronics [37], NXP [38],
and Ambiq [39], leveraging aggressive duty-cycling and sub-
10 µW deep-sleep modes to provide extremely low power
consumption on average. Other recent research platforms
optimize also the active state, exploiting near-threshold or sub-
threshold operation to improve energy efficiency and reduce
power consumption during computation [40][41][42][43].
Some commercial architectures leverage lightweight SW
acceleration and optimized DSP libraries to improve perfor-
mance. The NXP LPC54100 [38] is a commercial platform
where a big Cortex-M4F core acts as an accelerator for a little
ultra-low-power Cortex-M0 targeted at always-on applications.
From a software viewpoint, some optimized libraries have
been developed to efficiently implement crypto algorithms
on Cortex-M3 and M4 architectures, given the criticality of
this task for IoT applications. Examples of these libraries are
SharkSSL [44] and FELICS [5], able to encrypt one block of
AES-128-ECB in 1066 cycles and 1816 cycles respectively,
both targeting a Cortex-M3. On the other hand, CMSIS [45]
is a well-known set of libraries to optimize DSP performance
on Cortex-M architectures.
However, even with software-optimized libraries, these tiny
micro-controllers are unfortunately not suitable for secure
near-sensor analytics applications using state-of-the-art tech-
niques, which typically involve workloads in the orders of
billions of operations per second. For this reason, a few
recent SoCs couple programmable processors with hardwired
accelerators, to improve execution speed and energy efficiency
in cryptography and other performance-critical tasks. In the
field of embedded vison, heterogeneous SoCs of this kind
include the one recently proposed by Renesas [46], coupling
a general purpose processor with an FPU, a DSP, and a
signal processing accelerator. Intel [47] proposed a 14 nm SoC
where a small core with light signal processing acceleration
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Fig. 1: Fulmine SoC architecture. The SOC domain is shown
in shades of blue, the CLUSTER domain in shades of green.
cooperates with a vision processing engine for CNN-based
feature extraction and a light encryption engine, within a
22mW power budget. Pullini et al. proposed Mia Wallace, a
heterogeneous SoC [48] coupling four general purpose proces-
sors with a convolutional accelerator. In the field of bio-signals
processing, Konijnenburg et al. [49] proposed a multichannel
acquisition system for biosensors, integrating a Cortex-M0
processor and accelerators for digital filtering, sample rate
conversion, and sensor timestamping. Lee et al. [50] presented
a custom bio-signals processor that integrates configurable
accelerators for discriminative machine-learning functions (i.e.
SVM and active learning) improving energy by up to 145x
over execution on CPU.
Similarly to the presented designs, Fulmine is a low-power,
heterogeneous MPSoC. In contrast to the other architectures
presented here, it tackles at the architectural level the challenge
of efficient and secure data analytics for IoT end-nodes,
while also providing full programmability with sufficient high
performance and low power to sustain the requirements of
several near-sensor processing applications.
III. SOC ARCHITECTURE
The Fulmine multi-core System-on-Chip (Figure 1) im-
plements a secure near-sensor data analytics architecture,
which leverages highly efficient processors for software pro-
grammable signal processing and control, flexible hardware
acceleration for cryptographic functions, convolutional neural
networks, and a highly optimized subsystem implementing
power management and efficient communication and synchro-
nization among cluster resources. The architecture, based on
the PULP platform [51], is organized in two distinct voltage
and frequency domains, CLUSTER and SOC, communicating
through an AXI4 interconnect and separated by dual-clock
FIFOs and level shifters. Two frequency-locked loops (FLLs)
are used to generate clocks for the two domains, which rely on
separate external voltage regulators for their supply and can be
4independently power-gated. The FLLs work with a 100 kHz
external reference clock and support fast switching between
different operating modes (less than 10 reference cycles in the
worst case).
The CLUSTER domain is built around six processing el-
ements (four general-purpose processors and two flexible
accelerators) that share 64 kB of level 1 Tightly-Coupled Data
Memory (TCDM), organized in eight word-interleaved SRAM
banks. A low-latency logarithmic interconnect [52] connects
all processing elements to the TCDM memory, enabling fast
and efficient communication among the resources of the
cluster. The TCDM interconnect supports single-cycle access
from multiple processing elements to the TCDM banks; if
two masters attempt to access the same bank in the same
clock cycle, one of them is stalled using a starvation-free
round-robin arbitration policy. The two hardware accelerators,
Hardware Cryptography Engine (HWCRYPT) and Hardware
Convolution Engine (HWCE), can directly access the same
TCDM used by the cores. This architecture allows data to be
seamlessly exchanged between cores and accelerators, without
requiring explicit copies and/or point-to-point connections.
To avoid a dramatic increase in the area of the TCDM
interconnect, as well as to keep the maximum power envelope
in check, the two accelerators share the same set of four
physical ports on the interconnect. The two accelerators are
used in a time-interleaved fashion, allowing one accelerator
full access to the TCDM at a time, which is suitable for data
analytics applications where computation can be divided into
several separate stages.
The four OR10N cores are based on an in-order, single-
issue, four stage pipeline, implementing the OpenRISC [53]
instruction set architecture (ISA), improved with extensions
for higher throughput and energy efficiency in parallel signal
processing workloads [54]. GCC 4.9 and LLVM 3.7 toolchains
are available for the cores, while OpenMP 3.0 is supported
on top of the bare-metal parallel runtime. The cores share
a single instruction cache of 4 kB of Standard Cell Mem-
ory (SCM) [55] that can increase energy efficiency by up to
30% compared to an SRAM-based private instruction cache
on parallel workloads [56]. The ISA extensions of the core
include general-purpose enhancements (automatically inferred
by the compiler), such as zero-overhead hardware loops and
load and store operations embedding pointer arithmetic, and
other DSP extensions that can be explicitly included by means
of intrinsic calls. For example, to increase the number of effec-
tive operations per cycle, the core includes single instruction
multiple data (SIMD) instructions working on 8 bit and 16 bit
data, which exploit 32 bit registers as vectors. Furthermore,
the core is enhanced with a native dot-product instruction
to accelerate computation-intensive classification and signal-
processing algorithms. This single-cycle operation supports
both 8 bit and 16 bit vectors using two separate datapaths
to reduce the timing pressure on the critical path. Fixed
point numbers are often used for embedded analytics and
signal processing applications; for this reason, the core has
also been extended with single-cycle fixed point instructions
including rounded additions, subtractions, multiplications with
normalization, and clipping instructions.
The cluster features a set of peripherals including a direct
memory access (DMA) engine, an event unit, and a timer. The
processors can access the control registers of the hardware
accelerators and of the other peripherals through a memory
mapped interface implemented as a set of private, per-core de-
multiplexers (DEMUX), and a peripheral interconnect shared
among all cores. The peripheral interconnect implements
the same architecture of the TCDM interconnect, featuring
a different addressing scheme to provide 4 kB of address map
for each peripheral.
The DMA controller available in the cluster is an evolution
of the one presented in [57], and enables fast and flexible com-
munication between the TCDM and the L2 memory trough
four dedicated ports on the TCDM interconnect and an AXI4
plug on the cluster bus. In contrast to traditional memory
mapped interfaces, access to the internal DMA programming
registers is implemented through a sequence of control words
sent to the same address, significantly reducing DMA pro-
gramming overheads (i.e. less then 10 cycles to initiate a
transfer, on average). The DMA supports up to 16 outstanding
1D or 2D transfers to hide L2 memory latency and allows 256
byte bursts on the 64-bit AXI4 interface to guarantee high
bandwidth. Once a transfer is completed, the DMA generates
an event to the cores that can independently synchronize
on any of the enqueued transfers by checking the related
transfer ID on the DMA control registers. Synchronization of
DMA transfers and hardware accelerated tasks is hardware-
assisted by the event unit. The event unit can also be used to
accelerate the typical parallelization patterns of the OpenMP
programming model, requiring, for example, only 2 cycles to
implement a barrier, 8 cycles to open a critical section, and
70 cycles to open a parallel section. These features are all
essential to guarantee high computational efficiency during
execution of complex tasks such as CNNs in Fulmine, as
detailed in Section IV.
The SOC domain contains 192 kB of L2 memory for data
and instructions, a 4 kB ROM, a set of peripherals, and a power
management unit. Furthermore, the SOC includes a (quad) SPI
master, I2C, I2S, UART, GPIOs, a JTAG port for debug, and
a (quad) SPI slave that can be used to access all the SoC
internal resources. An I/O DMA subsystem (uDMA) allows
to autonomously copy data between the L2 memory and the
external interfaces, even when the cluster is in sleep mode.
This mechanism allows us to relieve cores from the frequent
control of peripherals necessary in many microcontrollers, and
to implement a double buffering mechanism both between
IOs and L2 memory and between L2 memory and TCDM.
Therefore, I/O transfers, L2 memory to TCDM transfers, and
computation phases can be fully overlapped.
A sophisticated power management architecture distributed
between the SOC and CLUSTER domains can completely
clock-gate all the resources when idle, as shown in Figure 2
(idle mode with FLL on). The power manager can also be
programmed to put the system in a low power retentive state
by switching down the FLLs and relying on the low-frequency
reference clock (low freq and idle mode). Finally, it can be
used to program the external DC/DC converter to fully power-
gate the CLUSTER domain. The event unit is responsible for
5CPU CGBUSY
CPU CG
CPU CG
CORE CG
EN
EN
EN
EN
EVENT UNIT
DMAHWCRYPT HWCE
CG
Cluster
PMU
EN
Event
I/O
Subsystem
BUSY
SoC
PMU
FLL
FLL
EN
I/O Events 8
Ready To
Shutdown
External
PMU
SoC
Supply
Cluster
Supply
SoC Cluster
EN
EN
CLUSTER @0.8V
ACTIVE
LOW-FREQ (FLL o)
IDLE (FLL on)
IDLE (FLL o)
DEEP SLEEP
50 MHz
100 kHz
-
-
-
-
300 us
20 ns
300 us
DC/DC1
~10 mW
230 uW
600 uW
210 uW
~10 nW2
ACTIVE
LOW-FREQ (FLL o)
IDLE (FLL on)
IDLE (FLL o)
DEEP SLEEP
50 MHz
100 kHz
-
-
-
-
300 us
20 ns
300 us
300 us
~2 mW
130 uW
510 uW
120 uW
120 uW
CLOCK WAKEUP POWER
SOC @0.8V
CLOCK WAKEUP POWER
1Depends on DC/DC settling time.
2Cluster is power-gated in DEEP SLEEP mode.
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automatically managing the transitions of the cores between
the active and idle state. To execute a wait-for-event instruc-
tion, the cores try to read a special register in the event unit;
this load is kept stalled until the event comes so that the core
pipeline is stalled in a known state. After pending transactions
and cache refills are complete, the event unit gates the core
clock. The clock gating manager gates the cluster clock if the
idle mode is selected and no engine is busy, or it activates the
handshaking mechanism with the external regulator to power
gate the cluster if the deep-sleep mode is selected. Once the
wake-up event reaches the power management unit, the latter
reactivates the cluster, then it forwards the event notification
to the event unit, waking up the destination core on turn.
Figure 2 reports all the power modes along with their average
wakeup time and power consumption, divided between the
CLUSTER and SOC domains. As the CLUSTER and SOC
power domains are managed independently, it is possible to
transparently put the CLUSTER in idle, where it consumes less
than 1mW, when waiting for an event such as the end of an
I/O transfer to L2 or an external interrupt that is expected to
arrive often. It is possible to partially trade off wakeup time
versus power by deciding whether to keep the FLLs active in
idle mode: by paying a ∼400 µW cost, wakeup time is reduced
to essentially a single clock cycle (20 ns), versus a maximum
of 10 reference cycles (∼320 µs) if the FLL is off. The deep
sleep mode instead enables efficient duty cycling in the case
computing bursts are relatively rare, by completing power-
gating the CLUSTER domain and keeping the SOC domain in
a clock-gated, retentive state.
IV. CLUSTER-COUPLED ACCELERATOR ENGINES
In this Section we describe in detail the architecture of
the two cluster-coupled accelerator engines, HWCRYPT and
HWCE. The main purpose of these engines is to provide
a performance and efficiency boost on computations, and
they were designed to minimize active power, e.g. by using
aggressive clock gating on time-multiplexed sub-modules and
by making use of latches in place of regular flip-flops to
implement most of the internal buffering stages.
The shared-memory nature of the HWCRYPT and HWCE
accelerators enables efficient zero-copy data exchange with the
cores and the DMA engine, orchestrated by the cluster event
unit. This architecture enables complex computation patterns
with frequeny transfers of data set tiles from/to memory.
A typical application running on the Fulmine SoC operates
conceptually in the following way. First, the input set (e.g. a
camera frame) is loaded into the L2 memory from an external
I/O interface using the uDMA. The cluster can be left in sleep
mode during this phase and woken up only at its conclusion.
The input set is then divided into tiles of appropriate dimension
so that they can fit in the L1 shared TCDM; one tile is loaded
into the cluster, where a set of operations are applied to it either
by the SW cores or the HW accelerators. These operations
can include en-/decryption and convolutions (in HW), plus
any SW-implementable filter. The output tiles are then stored
back to L2 memory using DMA transfers, and computation
continues with the next tile. Operations such as DMA transfers
can typically be overlapped with computation by using double
buffering to reduce the overall execution time.
A. Hardware Encryption Engine
The Hardware Encryption Engine (HWCRYPT), as shown
in Figure 3, implements a dedicated acceleration unit for a
variety of cryptographic primitive operations, exploiting the
advantages of the shared memory architecture of the SoC. The
HWCRYPT is based on two parallel cryptographic engines,
one implementing the AES-128 [58] block cipher and the
other one implementing the KECCAK-f [400] [59] permutation
(a smaller version of the SHA-3 permutation) used in a
flexible sponge construction. The AES-128 engine includes
two instances of a round-based AES-128 design with a shared
on-the-fly round-key computation module. Each of the two
AES-128 instances is based on two cipher rounds supporting
both encryption and decryption. The round-key generator
keeps track of the last round-key during encryption operations,
which acts as the starting point to generate round-keys for a
decryption operation. The AES-128 engine of the HWCRYPT
implements the Electronic-Code-Book (ECB) mode as well
as the XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext
stealing (XTS) [60]. XTS uses two different encryption keys,
one to derive the initial tweak and the other one to encrypt the
data. When using the same key for deriving the initial tweak
Fig. 3: HWCRYPT datapath overview, with details of the AES-
128 and the sponge engine.
6and encrypting the data, the encryption scheme is changed
to XEX [61] without implications to the overall security.
Furthermore, the accelerator supports the individual execution
of a cipher round similar to the Intel AES-NI instructions [62]
to boost the software performance of other new AES round-
based algorithms [63], [64].
Although AES-128-ECB is a fast encryption mode, it is not
recommended to use it to encrypt larger blocks of data. Since
every block is encrypted independently using the same key,
the same plaintext always yields the same ciphertext, which
reveals patterns of the plaintext in the ciphertext. To overcome
this issue, the AES-128-XTS mode uses a so-called tweak
T to modify the encryption for each block. The encryption
function E in the block diagram denotes an AES-128-ECB
encryption with the key K1 and K2 respectively. The tweak
is XORed to the plaintext and to the resulting ciphertext of
the AES-128-ECB encryption. Since the tweak is different for
each block of plaintext, it is denoted as Ti for the i-th block
of data. The initial tweak T0 is computed by encrypting the
sector number SN , derived from the address of the data, using
the encryption key K1 and multiplying it with αi with i = 0.
The multiplication with αi ensures that the tweak is different
for each block. The XTS mode is defined by Equation 1:
Ti = EK1(SN)⊗ αi (1)
Ci = EK2(Pi ⊕ Ti)⊕ Ti
The address-dependent tweak Ti is derived by a multiplica-
tion between the initial tweak and αi. The multiplication is
performed in the finite Galois field1 GF
(
2128
)
defined by the
irreducible polynomial x128 + x7 + x2 + x + 1. AES-128-
XTS requires a 128-bit finite field multiplier and exponentiator,
which is rather complex in terms of VLSI implementation. To
reduce this complexity, we first observe that α is constant
with the recommended value α = 2. Ti is derived from
Ti−1 as a one-bit shift with a conditional XOR with the
irreducible polynomial, i.e. Ti = Ti−1⊗ 2, which implements
the multiplication by 2 in the Galois field GF (2128).
The sponge engine implements two instances of the KEC-
CAK-f [400] permutation, each based on three permutation
rounds. KECCAK-f [400]’s architecture is optimized to match
the length of the critical path of the AES-128 engine. Permu-
tations support a flexible configuration of the rate and round
parameters. The rate defines how many bits are processed
within one permutation operation, and it can be configured
from 1 bit to 128 bits in powers of two. This parameter
supports a trade-off between security and throughput. The
more bits are processed in one permutation call, the higher the
throughput - but with a cost regarding the security margin of
the permutation. The round parameter configures the number
of KECCAK-f [400] rounds applied to the internal state. It can
be set up as a multiple of three or for 20 rounds as defined
by the specification of KECCAK-f [400]. The two instances
of permutations are combined to implement an authenticated
encryption scheme based on a sponge construction with a
prefix message authentication code that additionally provides
1In the following, ⊗ denotes the 128-bit finite field multiplication in which
also the exponentiation is performed.
integrity and authenticity on top of confidentiality. In the
sponge construction for encryption, the initial state of the
sponge is filled with the key K and the initial vector IV . After
executing the KECCAK-f [400] permutation p, we sequentially
squeeze an encryption pad and apply the permutation function
to encrypt all plaintext blocks Pi via an XOR operation. Apart
from this favorable mode of operation, the sponge engine also
provides encryption without authentication and direct access
to the permutations to allow the software to accelerate any
KECCAK-f [400]-based algorithm.
The HWCRYPT utilizes two 32 bit memory ports of the
TCDM interconnect, while an internal interface performs the
conversion from 32 bit to the 128 bit format used by the
encryption engines. The system is designed so that memory
interface bandwidth matches the requirements of all cipher
engines. The HWCRYPT is programmed and started through
a dedicated set of configuration registers, which allows the
reconfiguration of a new encryption operation while the
HWCRYPT is busy by using a command queue that sup-
ports up to four pending operations. The current state of
the HWCRYPT can be monitored via status registers. The
accelerator supports a flexible event and interrupt system to
indicate when one or all operations have finished.
B. Hardware Convolution Engine
The Hardware Convolution Engine (HWCE) is based on a
precision-scalable extension of the design proposed by Conti
and Benini [30] to accelerate convolutional layers in deep
CNNs. These layers, which constitute the overwhelming ma-
jority of computation time in most CNNs [7], are composed of
a linear transformation that maps Nif input feature maps into
Nof output feature maps by means of a set of convolutional
filters; and a pointwise non-linear activation function, often
a rectifier (ReLU) . The linear part of convolutional layers
is usually the dominant operation by far; its typical form for
kof ∈ 0 · · ·Nof − 1 is the following:
y(kof) = b(kof) +
Nif−1∑
kif=0
(
W(kof , kif) ∗ x(kif)
)
. (2)
The specific task executed by the HWCE is the acceleration
of the accumulation of convolutions that are at the core of
Equation 2. To represent input/output pixels and weights, a
fixed-point data representation with 16 bits is used by default.
The number of fractional bits is configurable at run time.
HWCE can natively perform 5×5 and 3×3 convolutions, and
any arbitrary convolution by combining these two in software.
The key novelty in the HWCE design with respect to [30] is
that the Fulmine HWCE can exploit the relative insensitivity
of CNNs to weight approximation [65][32] by reducing the
arithmetic precision of the convolution weights to 8 or 4 bit.
In that case, the internal datapath is reconfigured so that two or
four convolutions respectively (on different output kof feature
maps) are computed simultaneously, while feature map pixels
still use the full 16 bit representation. In these scaled precision
modes, a similar level of accuracy to the 16 bit full precision
CNNs can be maintained by proper training, with access to
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Fig. 4: Fulmine HWCE architecture, with the controller shaded in red, the wrapper in green, and the datapath in blue. The
diagram also shows details of the line buffer and sum-of-products submodules microarchitecture.
significantly improved performance, memory footprint, and
energy efficiency as is shown in Section V.
Figure 4 depicts the HWCE architecture, which can be
divided into three main components: a datapath performing
the main part of the data plane computation in a purely
streaming fashion, relying on an AXIStream-like handshake
for back-pressure; a wrapper that connects and decouples the
datapath streaming domain from the memory-based cluster;
and a controller that provides a control interface for the
accelerator. In the full-precision 16 bit mode, the sum-of-
products datapath is used to perform a convolution between
a preloaded filter W (stored in a weight buffer) and a 5×5
xwin window extracted from a linear x input feature map
stream. Window extraction is performed by a line buffer,
which is realized with latch-based SCMs for optimized energy
efficiency. The line buffer is composed by a set of FIFO queues
with two read pointers: one to implement the mechanism to
pass the oldest pixel to the next FIFO and the other to extract
the 5×5 sliding window. The output of the sum-of-products
is summed to an input pre-accumulated yin value; in other
words, the accelerator needs no internal memory to perform
the feature map accumulation component of Equation 2 but
uses directly the shared memory of the cluster. The wrapper,
shaded in green in Figure 4 is responsible for generating
memory accesses through four memory ports to the TCDM to
feed the accelerator x,yin streams and write back yout (partial)
results. The controller (red in Figure 4) contains a register file
which can host a queue of two jobs, each consisting of pointers
to x, W, y, strides for the wrapper address generators, and
other configuration such as the number of fractional bits to use.
The controller is mapped in the cluster peripheral interconnect.
To support three different possible sizes for weights, the
HWCE sum-of-products datapath must be able to perform
16 bit × 16 bit products as well as 8 bit × 16 bit and 4 bit ×
16 bit ones. The two or four filters hosted in the weight buffer
in scaled precision modes are not consecutive, but they are in-
terleaved: in full precision mode a location represents a single
16 bit weight; in the scaled precision modes, it represents two
8 bit or four 4 bit weights. The sum-of-products datapath is
designed in a hierarchical way to maximize its reuse between
the three configurations. Four submodules (shown in orange
in Figure 4) compute the sum-of-products of xwin with a 4 bit
slice of W each, using a set of signed multipliers and a
first-stage reduction tree. A second-stage reduction tree and
a set of multiplexers are used to combine these four partial
sums-of-products to produce one, two or four concurrent
yout outputs; fractional part normalization and saturation are
also performed at this stage. As multiple accumulations of
convolutions are performed concurrently, the yin and yout
streamers are replicated four times. All HWCE blocks are
aggressively clock gated so that each component consumes
power only when in active use.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this Section, we analyze measured performance and effi-
ciency of our platform on the manufactured Fulmine prototype
chips, fabricated in UMC 65 nm LL 1P8M technology, in a
2.62mm×2.62mm die.
A. System-on-Chip Operating Modes
An important constraint for the design of small, deeply
embedded systems such as the Fulmine SoC is the maximum
supported power envelope. This parameter is important to
select the system battery and the external DC/DC converter.
To maximize energy efficiency, the worst case for the DC/DC
converter (i.e. the peak power) should not be too far from
the average working power to be delivered. However, a
SoC like Fulmine can operate in many different conditions:
in pure software, with part of the accelerator functionality
available, or with both accelerators available. These modes
are characterized by very different average switching activities
and active power consumption. In pure software mode, it
is often desirable to push frequency as much as possible,
while when using accelerators it can be convenient to relax
it to improve power consumption. Moreover, some of the
internal accelerator datapaths are not easily pipelined, as
adding pipeline stages severely hits throughput - this is the
case of the HWCRYPT sponge engine (Section IV-A), which
relies on tight loops of KECCAK-f [400] rounds as visible in
the datapath in Figure 3. Relaxing these paths can improve the
overall synthesis results for the rest of the circuit.
Multi-corner multi-mode synthesis and place & route were
used to define three operating modes that the developer can
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Technology Area Powera
Conv.
Perf.b Conv. Eff.
b Enc.
Perf.c
Enc.
Eff.c
SW
Perf. SW Eff.
Eq.
Eff.d
[mm2] [mW] [GMAC/s] [GMAC/s/W] [Gbit/s] [Gbit/s/W] [MIPS] [MIPS/mW] [pJ/op]
A
E
S
Mathew et al. [15] @ 0.43V, 324MHz Intel 22nm 2.74×10−3 0.43 - - 0.124 289 - - 0.19g
Zhang et al. [16] @ 0.9V, 1.3GHz TSMC 40nm 4.29×10−3 4.39 - - 0.446 113 - - 0.49g
Zhao et al. [17] @ 0.5V, 34MHz 65nm LL 0.013 0.05 - - 0.027 574 - - 0.10g
Hocquet et al. [18] @ 0.36V, 0.32MHz 65nm LP 0.018 2.5×10−4 - - 3.6×10−7 144 - - 0.39g
C
N
N
Origami [26] @ 0.8V, 190MHz UMC 65nm 3.09 93 37 402 - - - - 0.69g
ShiDianNao [27] 65nm 4.86 320 64 200 - - - - 1.39g
Eyeriss [28] @ 1V, 200MHz TSMC 65nm LP 12.25 278 23 83 - - - - 3.35g
Jaehyeong et al. [29] @ 1.2V, 125MHz 65nm 16.00 45e 32 710e - - - - 0.39g
Park et al. [31] @ 1.2V, 200MHz 65nm 10.00 37f 41 1108f - - - - 0.25g
Io
T
SleepWalker [41] @ 0.4V, 25MHz 65nm 0.42 0.175 - - - - 25 143 6.99
Myers et al. [40] @ 0.4V, 0.7MHz 65nm 3.76 0.008 - - - - 0.7 88 11.4
Konijnenburg et al. [49] @ 1.2V, 10MHz 180nm 37.7 0.52 - - - - 10.4 20 50.0
Mia Wallace [48] @ 0.65V, 68MHz UMC 65nm 7.4 9.2 2.41 261 - - 270 29 22.5
F
ul
m
in
e CRY-CNN-SW @ 0.8V, 85MHz
UMC 65nm LL 6.86
24 4.64 309 1.78 67 333 14
5.74KEC-CNN-SW @ 0.8V, 104MHz 13 6.35 465 1.6 100 408 31
SW @ 0.8V, 120MHz 12 - - - - 470 39
a Power and efficiency numbers refer to core power, excluding I/Os.
b Considering 1 MAC = 2 ops where Gop/s are reported. Fulmine numbers refer to the 4bit weights mode.
c Refers to AES-128-{ECB,XTS} for Fulmine in CRY-CNN-SW; KECCAK-f [400] for Fulmine in KEC-CNN-SW; else AES-128-ECB.
d Considering the local face detection workload of Section VI-B. 1op = 1 OpenRISC equivalent instruction from the set defined in [53].
e Weights produced on-chip from a small set of PCA bases to save area/power. No evaluation on the general validity of this approach is presented in [29].
f Performance & power of inference engines only, estimating they are responsible for 20% of total power.
g ASIC equivalent efficiency refers to an AES-only or CNN-only equivalent workload.
TABLE I: Comparison between Fulmine and several platforms representative of the state-of-the-art in encryption, data analytics,
and IoT end-nodes.
statically select for the target application: in the CRY-CNN-SW
mode, all accelerators and cores can be used. In the KEC-
CNN-SW mode, cores and part of the accelerators can be
used: the HWCE fully, the HWCRYPT limited to KECCAK-
f [400] primitives. In this mode, the frequency can be pushed
significantly further than in the CRY-CNN-SW mode. Finally,
in the SW mode, only the cores are active, and the operat-
ing frequency can be maximized. Figure 5 shows frequency
scaling in the three operating modes while varying the cluster
operating voltage VDD. The three modes were designed so
that at VDD =1.2V, current consumption under full load is
close to 100mA (i.e. 120mW of power consumption), as can
be seen in Figure 5b.
B. HWCRYPT Performance and Power Evaluation
Due to a throughput oriented hardware implementation,
HWCRYPT achieves a significant acceleration compared to an
optimized software implementation running on the OpenRISC
cores. To encrypt one 8 kB block of data using the AES-
128-ECB mode, HWCRYPT requires ∼3100 clock cycles
including the initial configuration of the accelerator. This is
a 450× speedup compared to a software implementation on
one core. When parallelizing the software implementation to
all four cores, the hardware accelerator still reaches a speedup
of 120×. The throughput of HWCRYPT in AES-128-ECB
mode is 0.38 cycles per byte (cpb).
The performance of the AES-128-XTS mode is the same
with respect to the ECB mode, thanks to parallel tweak
computation and encryption. When comparing that to an
optimized software implementation on a single core, this
speeds up the throughput by a factor of 495× and by a factor
287× when running on four cores. It is important to note
that, contrarily to the ECB mode, XTS encryption cannot be
efficiently parallelized in software due to a data dependency
during the tweak computation step.
The authenticated encryption scheme based on KECCAK-
f [400] achieves a throughput of 0.51 cpb by utilizing both per-
mutation instances in parallel. The first permutation encrypts
the data and the second one is used to compute the message
authentication code to provide integrity and authenticity. This
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Fig. 6: Performance and efficiency of the HWCRYPT and
HWCE accelerators in terms of time/energy for elementary
output.
performance is achieved in a maximum-rate configuration of
128 bit per permutation call and 20 rounds as specified by
KECCAK-f [400]. Reducing the rate and/or increasing the num-
ber of invoked permuations decreases the throughput while
increasing the security margin.
In Figure 6a, we present the performance of HWCRYPT
in terms of time and energy per byte, while scaling the
VDD operating voltage of the cluster. When normalizing these
values to the power consumption, we reach a performance of
67 Gbit/s/W for AES-128-XTS and 100 Gbit/s/W for KECCAK-
f [400]-based authenticated encryption respectively.
C. HWCE Performance and Power Evaluation
The Fulmine SoC includes many distinct ways to perform
the basic operation of CNNs, i.e. 2D convolutions. In software,
a naı¨ve single core implementation of a 5×5 convolution filter
has a throughput of 94 cycles per pixel. Parallel execution
on four cores can provide almost ideal speedup reaching
24 cycles/px. Thanks to the SIMD extensions described in
Section III, an optimized multi-core version can be sped up
by almost 2× down to 13 cycles/px on average.
With respect to this baseline, the HWCE can provide a
significant additional speedup by employing its parallel dat-
apath, the line buffer (which saves input data fetch memory
bandwidth), and weight precision scaling. We measured aver-
age throughput by running a full-platform benchmark, which
therefore takes into account the overheads for real world usage:
line buffer fill time, memory contention from cores, self-
contention by HWCE inputs/outputs trying to access the same
TCDM bank in a given cycle. Considering the full precision
16 bit mode for the weights, we measured an average inverse
throughput of 1.14 cycles per output pixel for 5×5 convolu-
tions and 1.07 cycles per output pixel for 3×3 convolutions -
the two sizes directly supported by the internal datapath of the
HWCE. This is equivalent to a 82× speedup with respect to
the naı¨ve single core baseline, or 11× with respect to a fully
optimized 4-core version.
As described in Section IV-B, the HWCE datapath en-
ables application-driven scaling of arithmetic precision in
exchange for higher throughput and energy efficiency. In the
8 bit precision mode, average inverse throughput is scaled
to 0.61 cycles/px and 0.58 cycles/px for the 5×5 and 3×3
filters, respectively; in 4bit mode, this is further improved to
0.45 cycles/px and 0.43 cycles/px, respectively. In the 4 bit
precision mode, the HWCE is fully using its 4-port memory
bandwidth towards the TCDM in order to load 4 yin partial
results and store back 4 yout ones. Further performance
scaling would therefore require an increase in memory band-
width.Figure 6b reports time and energy per pixel, running the
same set of filters in the KEC-CNN-SW operating mode while
scaling the VDD operating voltage. At 0.8V, the energy to
spend for an output pixel can be as low as 50 pJ per pixel,
equivalent to 465 GMAC/s/W for a 5×5 filter.
D. Comparison with State-of-the-Art
Table I compares Fulmine with the architectures that define
the boundaries of the secure data analytics application space
described in Section II. Apart from area, power and perfor-
mance, we also use an equivalent energy efficiency metric
defined as the energy that a platform has to spend to perform
an elementary RISC operation2. Fulmine achieves the highest
result on this metric, 5.74 pJ per operation, thanks to the
cooperation between its three kinds of processing engines.
The second-best result is of SleepWalker (6.99 pJ) - but in
an operating point where execution takes 89× more time than
in the case of Fulmine.
Moreover, Fulmine provides better area efficiency than
what is available in other IoT end-nodes: 32 SleepWalker
chips would be needed to achieve the same performance
as Fulmine in the workload of Section VI-B. On the other
hand, coupling an efficient IoT microcontroller with external
accelerators can theoretically provide an effective solution,
but it requires continuous high-bandwidth data exchange from
chip-to-chip, which is typically not practical in low-power
systems. Conversely, in Fulmine HW accelerators are coupled
to the cluster cores via the shared L1 memory, and no copy
at all is required - only a simple pointer exchange.
For IoT endnodes, the smaller footprint of a System-on-
Chip solution can also provide an advantage with respect to
a traditional system on board, which is heavier and bulkier.
Taking this reasoning one step further, while it is not always
possible to place sensors and computing logic on the same
die, the system we propose could be coupled to a sensor in a
System-on-Package solution, requiring only a single die-to-die
connection. Competing systems listed in Table I would require
the integration of more than two dies on the same package,
resulting in a more complex and expensive design.
VI. USE CASES
To evaluate the Fulmine SoC in full end-to-end applica-
tions, we propose three distinct use cases, which represent
2This is computed as the total energy per instruction on the workload
presented in Section VI-B, which provides a balanced mix of encryption,
convolution, other SW-based filters.
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a necessarily incomplete selection of possible security- and
performance-critical IoT sensor analytics applications. The
first use case represents deep-learning based sensor analytics
workloads that are predominantly executed locally on the
endnode, but require security to access unsafe external mem-
ory (secure autonomous aerial surveillance, Section VI-A); the
second one represents workloads executed only in part on the
endnode, which therefore require secured connectivity with an
external server (local face detection and remote recognition,
Section VI-B). Finally, the third use case represents workloads
in which, while analytics is performed online, data must also
be collected for longer term monitoring (seizure detection and
monitoring, Section VI-C).
For our evaluation, we consider the system shown in
Figure 7. We use two banks (16 MB) of Microchip
SST26VF064 bit quad-SPI flash memory to host the weights
for a deep CNN as ResNet-20; each bank consumes down
to 15 µA in standby and a maximum of 15mA@3.6V in
QPI mode. Moreover, we use 2 MB of non-volatile Cypress
CY15B104Q ferroelectric RAM (FRAM) as a temporary
memory for partial results. Four banks are connected in a bit-
interleaved fashion to allow access with quad-SPI bandwidth.
Both the FRAM and the flash, as well as a camera and an ADC
input, are connected to the Fulmine uDMA, which can be used
to transfer data to/from the SoC L2 memory. The cluster then
transfers tiles of the input data to operate on and writes results
back to L2 via DMA transfers. We focus on the power spent
for actual computation rather than on system power, i.e. we
include power spent in transfers from memory used during the
computation, but exclude data acquisition/transmission3.
A. Secure Autonomous Aerial Surveillance
For the secure autonomous aerial surveillance use case, we
consider deploying the system of Figure 7 on a low-power
nano-UAV such as a CrazyFlie nano quadcopter [66]. Storms
of tens or hundreds of these devices could provide diffused,
fully autonomous, and low energy footprint aerial surveillance.
In these vehicles the power budget for computing is extremely
limited (more than 90% of the battery must be dedicated to the
3 We measured performance on each kernel composing the three appli-
cations and for SPI and DMA transfers via RTL simulation, and the related
power consumption by direct measurement using an Advantest SoCV93000
integrated circuit tester, encapsulating the target kernel within an infinite loop.
Power is measured at two distinct frequencies to obtain leakage and dynamic
power density via linear regression. For external memories, we used publicly
available data from their datasheets, considering always the worst case.
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Fig. 7: A Fulmine SoC connected to 16 MB of Flash, 2 MB
of FRAM, and sensors (the grey area is taken into account for
power estimations).
quadrotor engines), and continuous wireless data transmission
from cameras is not an option due to its power overhead. Local
elaboration and transmission of high-level labeling information
provides a more efficient usage of the available power, while
also granting greater availability in situations like disaster
relief, where wireless propagation might be non-ideal and
enable only low-bandwidth communication.
Deployment of state-of-the-art deep CNNs on these devices
naturally requires external memory for the storage of weights
and partial results. These memories cannot be considered to
be secure, as the weights deployed in the Flashare an important
intellectual property and UAVs are fully autonomous, therefore
vulnerable to malicious physical hijacking . Partial results
stored in the FRAM and SPI traffic could be monitored or
modified by an external agent, with the purpose of changing
the final result classified by the UAV. Strong encryption for
weights and partial results can significantly alleviate this issue,
at the cost of a huge overhead on top of the pure data analytics
workload.
Here we consider a deep ResNet-20 CNN [10] to clas-
sify scenes captured from a low power sensor producing
a 224×224 input image. ResNet-20 has been shown to be
effective on CIFAR-10 classification but can also be trained for
other complex tasks, and it is in general a good representative
of state-of-the-art CNNs of medium size. It consists of more
than 1.35 × 109 operations, a considerable workload for a
low power end-node. External memories are required for
both weights (with a footprint of 8.9 MB considering 16 bits
of precision) and partial results (with a maximum footprint
of 1.5 MB for the output of the first layer). All weights
and partial results are en-/decrypted with AES-128-XTS; the
Fulmine cluster is considered the only secure enclave in which
decrypted data can reside.
Figure 8 shows execution time and energy spent at 0.8V
for this compound workload. We exploit the fast frequency
switching capabilities of Fulmine to dynamically switch from
the CRY-CNN-SW operating mode (at 85MHz) when executing
AES to the KEC-CNN-SW operating mode (at 104MHz) when
executing other kernels. The figure also shows a breakdown
of energy consumption regarding kernels (convolution CONV,
encryption AES), densely connected CNN layers (DENSE),
DMA transfers and other parts of the CNN (DMA, OTHER),
and external memories and I/O (FRAM, FLASH, SPI I/O).
In the baseline, where all the workload is run in software on
a single core, energy consumption is entirely dominated by
convolutions and encryption, with a 4-to-1 ratio between the
two. When more features of the Fulmine SoC are progressively
activated, execution time is decreased by 114× and energy
consumption by 45×, down to 27mJ in total - 3.16 pJ
per equivalent operation (defined as an equivalent OpenRISC
instruction from [53]). When CNNs use the HWCE with 4 bit
weights and AES-128-XTS uses the HWCRYPT, the overall
energy breakdown shows that cluster computation is no longer
largely dominant, counting for only slightly more than 50% of
the total energy. Additional acceleration would likely require
expensive hardware (e.g. more sum-of-products units or more
ports in the HWCE) and would yield diminishing returns in
terms of energy efficiency.
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Fig. 8: Secure autonomous aerial surveillance use case based on a ResNet-20 CNN [10] with AES-128-XTS encryption for all
weights and partial results. KEC-CNN-SW and CRY-CNN-SW operating modes at VDD =0.8V.
To concretely estimate whether the results make it feasi-
ble to deploy a ResNet-20 on a nano-UAV, consider that a
CrazyFlie UAV [66] can fly for up to 7 minutes. Contin-
uous execution of secure ResNet-20 during this flight time
corresponds to a total of 235 iterations in the operating point
considered here. This would consume a total of 6.4 J of energy
- less than 0.25% of the 2590 J available in the onboard battery
- and the low peak power of 24mW makes this concretely
achievable in an autonomous device.
B. Local Face Detection with Secured Remote Recognition
Complete on-device computation might not be the most
advantageous approach for all applications, particularly for
those that can be clearly divided in a lower effort triggering
stage and a higher effort one that is only seldom executed. A
good example is the problem of face recognition. While state-
of-the-art face recognition requires a significant workload in
the order of billions of operations (e.g. FaceNet [68]), the
problem can be easily decomposed in two stages: one where
the input image is scanned to detect the presence of a face,
and another where the detected faces are recognized. The first
stage could be run continuously on a low-power wearable
device such as a smartwatch, using an external device (e.g. a
smartphone, the cloud) to compute the much rarer and much
more complex second stage.
We envision Fulmine to be integrated into an ultra-low
power (ULP) smartwatch platform similar to that presented
in Conti et al. [69]. We consider a similar camera with
the one used in Section VI-A producing a 224×224 input
image. Face detection is performed locally, using the first two
stages (12-net and 24-net) of the multi-stage CNN proposed
by Li et al. [67]. If faces are detected by this two-stage
CNN, the full input image is encrypted and transferred to a
coupled smartphone for the recognition phase. The networks
are applied to small separate 24×24 windows extracted from
the input image; partial results need not be saved from one
window to the next. Therefore the CNN does not use any
external memory and can rely exclusively on the internal L2.
Figure 9 reports the experimental results for the local
face detection use case in terms of energy and execution
time. Baseline energy is almost evenly spent between con-
volutions, AES-128-XTS encryption, and densely connected
CNN layers. Software optimizations such as parallelization,
SIMD extensions are much more effective on convolutional
and dense layers than they are on AES, due to XTS internal
data dependencies in the tweak computation. Using hardware
accelerators essentially reduces the energy cost of convolution
and on AES-128-XTS to less than 10% of the total, and leads
to a 24× speedup and a 13× reduction in energy with respect
to the baseline. With all optimizations, face detection takes
0.57mJ or 5.74 pJ per elementary operation. This face
detection could be performed with no interruption for roughly
1.6 days before exhausting the battery charge, if we consider a
small 4V 150mAh lithium-ion polymer battery. Duty cycling,
taking advantage of the power management features of the SoC
described in Section III, can prolong this time considerably.
C. Seizure Detection and Secure Long-Term Monitoring
Extraction of semantically relevant information out of
biosignals such as electromyogram (EMG), electrocardiogram
(ECG), and electroencephalogram (EEG) is a potentially huge
market for low-power footprint IoT devices. Here we consider
a seizure detection application based on a support vector
machine (SVM) trained on energy coefficients extracted from
the principal components analysis (PCA) of a multi-channel
EEG signal [70][71]. The sampling frequency is 256Hz with
50% overlapped windows, i.e. seizure detection is performed
every 0.5 s. Starting from a 256-sample window of 23 input
EEG channels (represented as 32 bit fixed-point numbers),
PCA is applied to extract 9 components, that are then trans-
formed by a digital wavelet transform (DWT) to extract
energy coefficients, which are classified by an SVM. For
long-term monitoring, the components produced by the PCA
have to be collected and sent to the network to be stored or
analyzed, which requires encryption due to the sensitivity of
this data.
Figure 10 shows the results in terms of energy (split down
between the various kernels) and execution time. Several
components of PCA, like diagonalization, are not amenable to
parallelization. Nonetheless, we observe a 2.6× speedup with
four cores excluding AES encryption. Using the HWCRYPT,
encryption becomes a transparent step of the algorithm and
essentially disappears from the overall energy breakdown.
Therefore, with combined SW parallelization and accelerated
encryption, an overall 4.3× speedup and 2.1× energy reduc-
tion can be achieved. More importantly, the absolute energy
consumption of 0.18mJ (12.7 pJ per operation) means that a
typical 2Ah@3.3V pacemaker battery [72] would suffice for
more than 130 million iterations, and more than 750 days if
used continuously - as for most of the time the Fulmine SoC
can be in deep sleep mode.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This work presented Fulmine, a 65 nm System-on-Chip
targeting the emerging class of smart secure near-sensor data
analytics for IoT end-nodes. We achieve this without using
aggressive technology or voltage scaling, but through the
architectural solution of combining cores and accelerators
within a single tightly-coupled cluster. The use cases we have
proposed show that this approach leads to improvements of
more than one order of magnitude in time and energy with
respect to a pure software based solution, with no sacrifice
in terms of flexibility. The Fulmine SoC enables secure,
integrated and low-power secure data analytics directly within
the IoT node. Without any compromise in terms of security,
the proposed SoC enables sensemaking in a budget of a few
pJ/op - down to 3.16 pJ/op in one case, or 315 Gop/s/W.
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